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COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
COM(93)  512  final 
Brusse Is. 20  October  1993 
COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  TO  THE  COUNCIL 
FUTURE OF 11rfE ECSC TREA1Y 
BORROWING/LENDING AClWIIY L  INTRODUCTION 
I  In its Communication of 15 March 1991 to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the future of the ECSC Treaty (Doc. SEC (91) 407 final). the Commission came 
out in favour of  letting the Treat;y expire when it comes to the end of  its period of 
validity in 2002, vJ:rile taking advantage of its flexibility to adapt its application to 
the two sectors in ·such  a way that they  are gradually incorporated into the EEC 
Treaty. 
On  18  November  1992  the  Cominission  transmitted to  the  Council  a  working 
document (Doc. SEC (92) .1889 final) on the financial activities of the ECSC with 
a possible scenario for the phasing-.out of budgetary expenditure by 2002. 
With particular reference to ECSC borrowing/lending activity. the conclusions of  the 
"Industry"  Cmmcils  of 24  November  1992  and  4  May  1993,  call ·upon  the 
Commission  to  examine  the  qnestion  in  depth..  and  consider in particular 1he 
possibility of a total or partial takeover of this activity by  other financial bodies, 
such as the EIB. 
2  lu a result of  the Council's call, inter-departmental contacts took place between the 
Coinl!lis:sion  and the EIB  aimed  a:t  examining the scope for an EIB takeover of 
certain ECSC financial activities. The matter "W3S fim discussed by the EIB Board 
of  Directors on 20 July 1993. 
3  This note is  to apprise the Council of the prospects and implications of an Em 
takeover of certain ECSC financial activities, and of  the principal options resulting 
from those prospects_ 
The note deals, in order. with: 
- the point in the lifetime of a loan at which a transfer might be effected; 
- the various types of ECSC loans and their suitability for transfer; 
- the legal questions which would arise in the event of a transfer, 
•  the effects of  ECSC lending activity on 1he ECSC budget and on its reserves; 
- the consequences of such  a  transfer on the capital  markets  and on  the  ECU 
market. 
- the consquences of invoking an EEC guarantee~ 
- the prospects for a takeover of  this activity by financial bodies oilier than the EIB; 
· - the memorandum of  the French delegation of '12  February 1993; 
2 - the note by the Danish Presidency of 10 June 1993. 
4  The Commission now calls upon the Com1cil to complete its examination of.the loan  . 
applications still outstanding and to give the opinions requested without delay. To 
this end, an Annex (1) to this note provides further information on each application. 
The Commission stresses that delay in settling these outstanding cases is damaging 
to the image of  the Coilllllunity both within the Commmrity and abroad and- with 
regard to certain  applications  under Article 56 (2)  (a) prohibits the ECSC from 
making the planned regional grants. 
H.  ANALYSIS OF THE STAGE OF 1HE LOANS TO BE TRANSFERRED 
1.  ECSC Jnw omspdng 
As at 31.12.1992 total  ECSC loans {from  borrowed funds) disbursed and not yet 
reimbursed amounted to 7 724 million ecus. The reserves immobilized against these 
outstandings  amount  to  261  million ecus.  Annex  2  presents  the  methode  of 
calculation of  the ratio ("solvency ratiott) used by the ECSC to calculate the amo1mt 
to be pat in reserve. 
The first possibility would be the purely administrative transfer of  this portfolio to 
the EIB.  This would  amount  to simple sub-contracting of the monitoring of the 
loans., with no financial repercussions on the accounts of  the ECSC or the EIB other 
than an increase in the administrative costs. 
A  further possibility is  the assignment - in the legal sense of the word - of the 
outstanding ECSC loans to the EIB  (Le.  a sale of the portfolio to the EIB).  This 
would rais&  complex problems  which would require further  analysis.  Such  an 
assignment  would.  in  addition,  make  sense  only  if,  at  the  same  time.  the 
corresponding  department for ECSC  borrowings  were  also  transferred,  which  is 
hardly conceivable and would raise another series of legal and financial problems. 
Apart from 1he aspects mentioned above. negotiations would be needed wi1h the EIB 
on the financial details of  the transfer. after an evaluation of  the value of each loan..  · 
This wotdd inevitably involve either a direct guarantee from 1he Community (EEC) 
or from the ECSC, in which case the latter's guanmtee fund would be unavailable. 
The EIB is not interested in such a takeover. 
l.  ECSC loaDs signed but not yet disbursed and ECSC loans decided upon but not  y~ 
signed 
ECSC loans falling into this category amotmt to 3  182 million ecus as at 31.7.1993 
(Annex 3, subtotal I). For simplicity, the PECO facility of200 million ecus has also 
been included in this category, although in this case the procedure is not  yet entirely 
completed, since the Council must give its assent (un-der Article 95) to each l)f tb.-?. 
loans to be granted under the facili'  " 3. 
A transfer of  these loans could foree the EiB to reexamfue the loans and review the 
guarantees. This ~"f:Ud~ could be detrimental to the rights ac~  by third parties 
and could lead to IegBf proceedings a8airi$t the ECSC. · ·  .:  ..  .  .  ,  '  . . 
Talks with the representatives of the E1B show that there is no interest ill such a 
transfer.  .,.  . 
. . .  ~ 
•.  •  •  •  '  ,t  '  ..  ..  • .  • '  ~.  •  •  •  • 
Applieations for loans forwhidl dle~ bas alie!dy,been a  Commission ~ision·  but 
for wbieh diem is still no CoDDeiJ  ~nt 
The  applications  falling  into  this  category  araomit 'to '213 riilllion ecils'  as  at 
31.7.1993  (Annex  3,  subtotal  lla).  In  th~ case of these applications the  actual  . 
eramiiurtion bas been eompleted, and they shOUld be treated as 8bove. No 1!'8nsrer. 
therefore, is recommended. The EIB shares this view. 
4..  1@. appp~o..S  which have not yet been decided gOOn by die CoJIIJiiiWoia· 
.  - .  .  .  .  .  '  '  .  .  .  . .  . .  .  . ' .  .  .  .  -'  :  .  ~  :  .  ' 
thiS ·category hlchJd~ 
.  i.•.  .  ·:  '  .  • 
- applications for which the examination bas begun but has not yet resulted in  a 
.. favourable .decision by the Commission; 
~  '  .  .  ·  ... 
~- ~ieations  submitted to the CommisSion fur  which the exammarlon has ncit yet 
beg1m;  '  ·  ·  ·  · · 
b). 
:.  I 
The  applications  submitted to  the  Commission. for  ~ch  1he  examination  has 
already begun would cause problems.  ·  ·  · ·  ·  · ·  ·  ·  ··  ·  · :  ·.  ·.  ·  · · · 
:F~r. loan  'applications  pending.,  wru.cl!  have  not  ..  ~et been · examin_ed .  ·hy · the 
-Commission,  a transfer would be possi'ble with the agreement of the :client 
.  ~  .  '  '  ''  . 
-For,·new  loan  appliCations,  t~s with. the  E1,B  ~ye·  shown,  that,  shouid·:·the 
Commission wish to choose the option to transfer, the clear~  solUtion would'be for 
a notice to this  effect to  be published in the Official Journal  of the  European 
Conmnmities.  The content of such  a notice would still  have to be discussed in 
detaiL 
It is. im.po~t to  ~9te that  w?-enever :this present d~cument refers 'to a  "possible 
"takeover by the EIBn (in particular when analysing the  various types of  l<~im in 
Section UI below) ~t is making reference. only.  to new applications. 
4 DL  ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF LOAN 
1..  Loans under Article 54 (second paragnmhl of the ECSC Treaty 
a.)  Description 
Article 54 (second paragraph) of the ECSC Treaty authorizes the financing of any 
works and installations which contribute directly and primarily  to  increasing the 
production.  reducing  the production costs or facilitating  th.e  marketing of ECSC 
products_ 
These loans include in particular: 
~  "Consumption of Community coal"  loans (e.g.  the finBncing of thermal power 
stations); 
- "Consumption ofCommtmity steel" loans (e_g_ industrial projects involving either 
new applications for steel or improved competitiveness for steel  vis-a-vis any 
other product, or projects in which steel represents a significant proportion of  the 
cost of production. This category of loans  also  embraces major infrastructure 
projects of general  European interest such  as railways,  harbours, bridges  and 
tunnels); 
- .. Raw materials"  loans to the benefit of Community producers:  the ECSC has 
decided to finance  mining projects  inter alia in Norway.  Sweden.  Africa. the 
United States, Australia and South America 
The total outstanding on 'these I  oms as at 3 L 12.1992 was  1 682 million ecus. 
The reserves immobilized against these outstandings amount to  41  million ecus. 
Article  54  (second  pa:ragtaph)  loans  disbursed  in  1992  amounted  to 
831 million ecus.  These were all Ks:teel  consumption" loans. 
b)  Possibility of takeover by the EIB 
No change would be required in  EIB rules or procedures for most new applications 
tmder article 54.2 (e.g. infrastructure loans). In the case of the other projects not 
falling  within  these eligibility  criteria.  it would  be necessary  for  the competent 
Community bodies to manifest the Community's interest in their financing. In non 
EEC countries  the EIB COJild operate only  at the Council's invitation and possibly 
'With a budgetary guarantee. 
c)  Advantages 
The  EIB  and the  ECSC  already  have  some  shared  experience  in  the  case of 
"infrastructure" loans. acquired in a number of co-financing operations. 
Such  a  transfer  would  be  in line  with  the  proposals  contained  in the  French 
Memorandum and 'the Danish Presidency Note_ 
5 The Em itself is wiJling to accept such a transfer. 
Thetransfer could be implemented very quickly, for  e~ple  on 1 January 1994. 
The Commission could publish a communication· in the Official Journal advising the 
public of this_ 
d)  Disadvantages 
The Em is insisting on maintaining im u.sual lending. criteria. in particular in. terms 
of quality of investmen'ls and promoters, adaptation to  market prospects. risks and 
seeuricy  offered- The  Bank  'Wishes  ·to  avoid. any  alteration  of its  basic'  .. policy 
principles,  notably  non-discrinllnation  about the  origin of supplies  required to 
complete a project The "consump1ion of Community steel"  clause. in the "major 
infrastructme" loans would, doubtless, not be included whiclt would entail :the loss 
of  the ECSC specificity of  these loans. 
'. 
There are a number of projects und.er Article. 54 (second par~h)where  further 
intervention· .would be in the interests of the Comnumity  and which the EIB  is 
.  empowered to· take on but in respect .of which it prefers., for internal operational  .  .  . 
reasons, .not to increase .i'ls participation·  .. This was the case for the finan~g  of  .the 
Channel Tunnel, when in 1991 1he Em .preferred not to contribUte fu:x-tpe~ md when 
the ECSC, with a credit line of  £200 million (265 million ecus) was able to confinn 
the ·  Community"s  interest and confidence in this  important project The ECSC's 
gesture had the full support of the E1B  and made a significant contribl,ltion to .the 
financing of  the project by reassuring the· consortium of  private-sector banks. This 
additional nature of the financial  i:nstrumen1s,  and 1he  resulting synergy.  would  . 
disappear with the transfer.  Bankers do not calculate the amount they will lend by 
.  counting .the different types of  finance for which the. project is eligible: they, simply 
assess the total risk they are willing· to take· on. It is therefore unlikely that, .in th.e 
event of the transfer, the BIB  will raise the level of its intervention in any  given 
project. 
.  '  .  .  .  '  ~ .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .. : . 
It should also be noted that, from the point of  view of  the instrument's objective~ the 
transfer  would  as  a  rule  do  little to  reduce the level  of reserves,  since  major 
infrastructure works are for the most part carried out by public bodies, and this, in 
accordance with the solvency ratio Directive. require no immobilization of  reserves. 
Article 54 (second paragraph) loans disbursed.in 1992 totaled 831  million ecus.. of 
Which 765 million ecus .was for major infrastrucure projects and 66 mlllion ·ecus for 
Communi~  steel  ~nsumption global loans. Of the "major infrastructure" loans a 
total.of ~25 million ecus required no  constitution of re5erves.  Fo:r the remaining 
infrastructure· loans,  i.e.  140 million ecus,  reserves  of  i5.2 million ecus  were 
immobilized. 
6 e)  Variant 
The attraction of these loans  bas been demonstrated by  the fact that,  despite the 
existence of EIB  infrastructure loansp  the promoters of major projects,  who  are 
mostly public bodies with the highest possible rating. apply regularly to the ECSC. 
The Com.mission  wishes to maintain the potential of the Treaty  as  welt  as  the 
operational flexibility described above,  and proposes to limit the transfer to the EIB 
to those loans under Article 54 (second paragraph) which imply the immobilization 
of  reserves (i.e. those not granted to. or guaranteed by. public bodies). At the same 
time. the poSSI.bility of  ECSC intervention should be maintained for the cases where 
the  Em  does not 'Wish to grant the loan requesteci 
The Commission would. of course. have to  demonstrate this to be the case when 
submitting its request for the assent of the Cotmcit 
Doubtless. the "consumption of  com.mwity steel" clause could not be taken over as 
it is by the EIB. However. that does not exclude the Commission and the EIB from 
taking care that the latter. in the cboice of  the large infrastructure projects to which 
it wishes to conin"bute. from taking fully into accotmt their community interest and 
their conformity with the orientaion of community policies, as is the case notably 
for  the  temporary  loans  mechanism  decided  at  Edinbmgh  and  confirmed  at 
Copenhagen. 
2~  I..oaos under  Article 54 (f"mt pgmmh) of dle ~C  Treaty 
a)  Description 
Article  54  (first paragraph)  of the  ECSC  Treaty provides for the financing  of 
investment programmes in coal and steel undertakings. 
LoatU outstanding at 31.12.1992 totalled 2 764 million ecus_ 
Reserves immobilized '=-o-ainst these outstandi.ngs total  127 million ecus. 
Article 54 (first paragraph) loans ~"'bursed in  1992 amotmted to 215 million eC1.is. 
b)  Possibility of takeover by tbe EIB 
As a result of this specific provision in the ECSC Treaty. the EIB has only rarely 
taken action in this field. Under its current regulations. the E1B can only act if  the 
investment is made in a  region eligible  to benefit from 1he  structural funds.  An 
extension of  the criteria of  eligtbility would require a decision by the EIB Board of 
Govemo~  at the request of the Council of the Eutopean Communities. 
7 at 
c)  Advatrtages 
The French Memorandum is in favour of the takeover of this activity by the EIB_ 
In its discussions  with certain  Commission departments, the EIB  has  said it is in 
favour of this option, while leaving OPen the question of the timing of  the transfer. 
It Should be noted that loans under Article 54 (first paragraph) are often backed by 
real security, i.e.  neither government guarantees (outlawed under the code on aid 
applicable to ECSC sectors) nor bank guarantees, and therefore tie up significant 
reserves in implementation of the solvency ratio Directive.  Thus, in 1992 alone 
21.9 million ecus were put aside for this ratio_ 
d)  Disadvantages 
The EIB  insists that here, as for  loans  under  Article  54 (second paragraph).  it 
. · intends to maintain. the customary criteria. for granting loans_ 
·  . However, the coal and steel sectors are currently un.dergoing a crisis. Transferring 
financing of  these sectors to the ElB would be tantamo1.mt to treating them now as 
if it were already the year 2002. i.e.  ~if  the ECSC Treaty DO  longer existea. 
.  . 
The Cotnmission is currently looking into the option of assisting the restructuring 
of  the ECSC sectors by means of a mfijor loan linked to an initiative under Article 
53a of1he Treaty (the ECSC legal basis for1his aci:ion is cmrently being examined). 
Such an initiative could not be carried out v.i.thin the framework of the EIB. 
The  No~e from the Danish Presidency does not envisage the transfer of activities 
under Article 54 (first paragraph). 
e)  ·Variant 
The transfer could be postponed \Dl'til the restructuring of  the sectors is completed 
which would allow the EIB to implement the appropriate preparation measures. 
The ECSC  could,  in  any  case,  e'ctend  its present  cooperation  with  the  EIB  by 
encouraging the Bank to participate in the financing of incoming ArtiCle 54 (first 
paragraph) loan applications. using 1he Bank's own criteria, e.g.  regional criteria. 
3.  lnans under Article 56  (2) (al of me EQJC Tre!ty 
a)  Description 
Arti~le 56 (2) (a) provides for the financing of  programmes for the creation of  new 
and economically sound activities or1he oonversion of  existing imderta.lcings capable 
of reabsorbing redtmdant ECSC worke~  into productive employment These loans 
8 are kno?m as "conversion loans". 'They  are generally accompanied by  an  interest 
rebate  of 3% for 5 years. 
The main aim  of  these loans is to combat industrial decline in ECSC employment 
areas s:ffected by the crisis by promoting the setting-up of  new economic activities_ 
ECSC action takes the forrn of  direct loans for financing major projects and global 
loans for financing mainly SMEs or small projects_ 
Loans outstanding at 31.12.1992 totalled 3 034 million ecus_ ReserveS immobilized 
against these outstandings total 86 million ecus. 
Article 56 (2) loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to 426 million ecus. 
b)  Possibility of takeover by ihe EIB 
The Em is also  involved in :r:nost of these regions. where it grants both  direct and 
global loans_ However, its loans are not accompanied by rebates_ Ttvo scenarios are 
conceivable: the takeover of the lo:ms by the EIB without rebates, or mth rebates 
financed from the ECSC budget 
The future of  Article 56 loans desetves further examinatio~ particularly in view of 
the  implementation  of  the  conclusions  of  the  recent  European  Council  1n 
Copenhageri. (in particular the temporary mechanism in favour of SMEs). 
c)  Advantages 
The majority of ECSC conversion loans are "global loans"_  These are granted to 
credit institutions.  According to the "solvency ratio" Directive, a weighting of  20% 
is necessary. In 1992,  11.9 million ecus  have been put aside for this ratio.  In 
addition. the rebates in respect of loans under Article 56(2)a have a considerable 
impact (currently over 100 million ecus per annum) on the ECSC budget. 
The Em has said it is in favour of the transfer. though it wishes to  consider the 
matter further and feels that the transfer should take place at a later date. 
d)  Disadvantages 
The Commission has recently made great efforts to place conversion activities more 
squarely  in the  context of the reibrm of the  structural  funds  (see  new criteria 
published in OJ C  59  of 6.3.1992).  These efforts  should  bear fruit.  particularly 
within the CSFs connected with Objective 2 covering the period 1994-96. 
The global  con~  between the ECSC and the financial  institutions all  have a 
duration of 81  least tin"ee  years. It would not be advisable to interfere with them 
whils:t the agreements are still in fc•rce-
The rebate mechanism for loans m1der Article 56 (2) (a) is compl~  and transferring 
it to the EIB would give rise ta tec-hnical  difficulties. 
9 •••  r 
Furthermore. there is some question as to the fate of  the ECSC rebates under Article 
56 (2) (a) in the event of  transfer.  · 
\Vhile  this  elimination  (as  recommended by  the  French  Memorandum)  would 
considerably  lighten  the ECSC  budget,  it would be  unthinkable  to  enforce the 
current social claUses concerning job creation without granting rebates on the loans. · 
The European Council in Copenhagen showed its interest in this type of scheme by 
inviting the ECOFIN Council to look into the possibility of incorporating interest 
rebates linked to job creation. similar to those granted by the ECSC. into EIB loans  to  SMEs under its temporary lending facility.  · · 
Without the  rebates,  loans under  Article  56  (2)  (a)  would  lose  much  of their 
attraction and impact 
At present, this instrument is additional to the other structural instruments. If  it were 
transferred, it would lose this additionality. 
e)  Variants 
(i)  It is conceivable that the takeover by the EIB of loans under Article 56 (2) 
·(a) might take place only from 1997 onwards. 
Obviously, this option (including the question of  interest rebates) would have to 
be reexamined m  the light of  the implenientation of recent measures to promote 
conversion (Copenhagen smnmit and structural funds). 
(ii)  Another means of  rapidly unlocking the ECSC's reserves would be an EEC 
budget guarantee.  This pc1ssibility is examined further in Section 7 of  this 
~ernorandurn.  · 
4.  ECSC loans for workers' housing 
.  a)  !Jescrip1ion 
The ECSC is empowered to facilitate the construction. purchase or modernization 
of  housing for workern in the coal and steel industries. 
Most of these loans are financed from the ECSC's own funds (special reserve and 
part of the former ECSC Pension Fund). The ECSC accounts for the year ending 
31. 12.1992 showed the special fund standing at 188 mi Ilion ecus,  and the former 
ECSC  Pension  Fund  at  57 million ecus.  The  totals  of these  reserves  remain 
unchanged: workers' housing programmes are limited to re-cycling repayments of 
earlier loans. giving an  annual  disposable sum of around 12 million ecus.  These 
loans  are very long-term  (around  25  years)  ancL  for social  reasons,  yjeld token 
interest at the rate of 1  %. 
10 o· 
The  total  outstanding  on  these  loans  at  31.12.1992  was  222 million ecus,  i.e. 
157 million ecus out of  own funds (special reserve plus part of the former Pension 
Fund) and 65 million ecus out of borrowed funds. 
Workers'  housing  loans  out of own  funds  do  not  require  to  be  weighted  in 
accordance with the solvency ratio, since they already fully immobilize the special 
reserve. 
Workers' housing loans out of  borrowed funds obviously immoblize reserves, but  the 
amount is negligeable because of  1he Slllall volume of these loans and their low rate 
of  weighting., since they are disbursed mainly to banks. 
Workers' housing loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to  13  million ecus. 
b)  Possibility of  mlreover by tbe EIB 
Transferring  the  loans  would  not  really  be  possible  without  transferring  the 
corresponding reserves. The transfer would consequently not release any resources. 
These loans meet neither the EIB's current criteria for eligibility of operations nor 
its normal banking criteria 
The  taking  over of this  activity  by  the  EIB  is  not possible  under  the  present 
conditions. 
c)  Variant 
The "workers'  housing"  loans funded  from  own  resources account for  100% of 
changes in reserves other than the guarantee fund. 
As was pointed out above. a transfer would not solve the problem of the reserves. 
Offering a guarantee from the EEC budget would not be a solution either. in the 
case of the workers' housing loans. the provision against reserves is not the result 
of applying the solvency ratio, but simply  of the fact that these loans have been 
granted directly from the special reserve and from part of the former Pension Funci 
The only way in which the funds  c.an gradually become available (as the loans are 
repaid) is to stop granting further loans. 
This. however, should not be done without serious preliminary reflection as  these 
loans belong to the old tradition of ECSC financial activity and have an important 
· social impact With this instrument. at 31.12.1992 the ECSC had financed more than 
203 000 homes with its 11  programmes of workers' housing. 
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c•:  s.  ECSC facility of- 200 million ecus for tbe commies of Centml and Eas1em Europe 
;.  ! 
a)  Desttiptioo 
On 5 March J 990 the. Community decided to make ECSC loans available for the 
financing  of certain  investments  (displaying an  ECSC  interest) in  Hungazy. and 
Poland, up to  a maximum of 200 million ecus.  Since 1991  this decision has also 
been applicable to Bulgaria. the D:ech Republic. Romania and Slovakia. 
A loan of 12.5 million ecus was approved in 1991 for the financing of a project in 
Poland, although no payment had yet been made by 31.12.1992.  A second project 
. (43.7 million ecus) was approved. by the Commission this year (1993) and is now 
.  before  1he Cotmcil for its assent.  · 
This  activity  is  liable  to  develop·  considerably  with  the  conversion  of ECSC 
activities in  1he countries of Central and Eastem Europe,. and 1he preparations made 
by these countries for foil association with the Community. 
b)  Possibility of takeo11er by tbe E1B 
The  EIB  can  operate in these  cotmtries  after  a  Cotmcil  decision  and  with the 
guarantee of  the EEC budget 
c)  Disadvamages 
This action has received the assent of the Council pursuant to Article 95  of the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and has. been notified 
to the cotmtries concerned. 
The EIB is not interested in taking over this activity without a  guaran~ee from the 
EEC: 
W.  LEGAL ASPECTS 
.  .  . 
As  regards the cessation of loans made by the Commission on  the basis of 1he ECSC 
treaty. it needs to be pointed out that fina~cing by the Commission is expressly foreseen 
by articles 54 and 56 of  the Treaty of Paris and that it constitutes an important political 
responsibility for this institution. 
In  consequence.  even  if one  can  .con.:rider  that  in  the  present  circumstances.  the 
Commission has the right to stop. its fi.n.ml:cing activities. it must be ceitain that the sectcts 
concerned are not deprived of the fmar1cial  backing which they can  e1qlect from the 
community institutions_ 
12 To this e11~ it must be arranged for the EIB, at the invitation of  the CounciL to integrate 
into its criteria of  eligibility the conditions laid down in articles 54 and 56, in step with 
the Commission stopping its financial activities. 
Article 232 §  1 of the EEC treaty which  incorporates the rule that the ECSC treaty 
constitutes a lex s_pecialis in relation to the EEC treaty, does not appear to put an obstacle 
in the way of  such an intervention which does not involve any modification of  the pewers 
of  the ECSC institutions nor the roles laid down by the ECSC treaty. 
In  order  to  guarantee  the  continuation  of financial  interventions  as  well  as  the 
transparency of  the actions of  1he commanity institutions it is necessazy for the economic 
operators to be informed well in advance of  1he date from which loan demands have to 
be  addressed  to  the  EIB~ with  the  undemtanding  that  demands  lodged  with  1he 
Commission before the communication of  the suspension of its financial activities 'Will 
be able to follow 'their normal course. 
V.  EFFECIS ON THE ~C  BUDGET 
The ECSC's lending activities normally have two effects on the ECSC budg~  i.e. a direct 
effect through the provision for interest rebates linked to Article 56 loans.. and an indirect 
effect thr•>ugh the reserves (part of the guarantee funds) which are to be constituted or 
maintained in accordance with the solvency ratio Directive, which reduce by the same 
amount the budgetary resources. 
1.  While the interest rebates have a major effect on the ECSC budget, in that they 
immobilize almost a quarter of  its resources. the decision on "What action to take on 
them appears  to  come more from political priorities than  from  the decision  to 
maintain withm the Commission the lending activity as  such.  Accordingly, it is 
sufficient to confine ourselves to two important points7  viz..: 
(i)  Even for the signed loans which have not been disbursed. the ECSC is 
protected by a  clause limiting its obligations to granting rebates only in 
accordance wi1h budgetary resources.  While this clause does not cover the 
"moral obligation,. to grant rebates on authorized lo~  it at least has the 
merit of protecting the Comnrission from legal proceedings_ 
(ii)  The Article 56 loans decided upon  but not signed and the loans which 
have been signed but not disbursed (cf. Annex 3) totalled 2 141 million 
ecus on .31  July 1993.  For direct loans (336 million ecus) the rebates can 
be modulatecl  For global loans (I 805 million ecus) there is very little 
flexibility, and if  these loans were to be disbursed in their  entirety~ and 
received full rebates, the rebates would in theory total270.75 million ecus, 
to be spread over five years_ 
13 2. ·.  ·On the other han~  the question.ofthe effect of  the lending activities on the ECSC 
budget by immobilizing the reserves m~  very particular attention.. 








Annex  4  gives  .the  potential  releases  from  the  guarantee  fimd  . 
a>rresponsding to the repayment schedule of  current loans.  This amiex is 
based on th~  outstandings as at 31.12.199~ excluding new operations due . 
or completed after that date. 
Annex 4 gives the following potential releases for the period 1993-1996: 
31  million ecus 
23 million ecus 
31  million ecus 
82 million ecus 
167 million ecas 
Against this prospect. we must consider: 
-.  3 182 million ecus ·loans signed but not disbursed and loans decided upon 
'but not yet signed (cf. Annex 3, subtotal! and item 2 on page. 2). These 
lo~  which ·cannot be taken over by the Em. will be disbursed in part 
over the period 1993·1996; 
213  million  ecus  applications  for  loans  already  decided  upon  by  the 
Commissio~ but which have not yet received the· Council's  assent (d. 
AnnC't 3. subtotal na and paragraph 3 on page 3); 
· 2 168  ·Imllion eeus applications for loans received by the Commission, 
which are at various stages of  the procedure, but on which no. decision bas 
yet ·been taken (cf. Arinex 3, subtotalllb).  Not all of  1hese applications 
will be agreed. but normally a fair number would result in loans over the 
period 1994-:1996; 
I  000  million  ecos  new  ECSC  loans  for  prefinancing  Article  53(a) 
financial  mechanisms  (see  Annex  3,  sub-total  111 ),  'Which  could  be 
implemented over the period 1993-1994. 
At this stage 1he sum total of  'these· "potential loans" is estimated at 6 565 million 
ecus.  It is probable 1hat  these  loans  will  not  be disbursed  in.  their  entirety 
aithough no figores  for this  can be estimated.  Neverthele5~ even  their partial 
~sbursement would requice reserves to be immobilized which would no doubt 
offset the release of the above-mentioned 167 million ecus.  As an indication, the 
167 million ecuS released would. if  the ECSC's solvency r.dio is maintained at i1S 
present level~ enable the following lending transactions to be launched: · 
14 1 193 million ecus loans nua.ranteed by mortgages; 
- or  5 964 million ecus loans ,btnaranteed by banks; 
...  or  an undefined sum covered by government guarantees; 
- or  a combination of the furet: possibilities. 
It needs to be stated that thes 167 million ecus would not pennit the guaranteeing 
of all the demands foreseen and that in any case, these reserves will be allocated 
as a priority to covering the loans already decided by the Commission; as well as 
the loans  for prefinancing the fianacial  mechanism loans in a  ccordance with 
article 53  a  It should be remembered that for these 1~  "adequate guarantees, 
negotiated case by case, shall be offered in each case by all paying companies 
proportional to their exposure and accepted by ECSC before granting any loan. 
This mechanism requires bank guarantees callahle on first demand - except ill 
those specific cases where the Cctmmission decides to the contrary". 
However, it should be stated that following the recent decisions adopted by the 
Commission concerning the ECSC budget (use of  the net balance), any default by 
debtors would mean an.  immediatE~ call on the guarantee funds. If  the crisis in the 
coal and steel industries continues, even an increase in the guarantee funds should 
not be lllled out. 
(iii)  Annex 4 shows, for the period 1997-2002, potential releases of  reserves to 
'the  ttme of 77.7 million -ecus.  1bis sum would only become actually 
available if, in the same period, no new loans were granted or, if they 
were, they did not require the immobilization of  .reserves_ 
However,  to  this  amount  can  be added the  reserves  which  would  be 
released,  during this  perioci  following  repayment of loans  previously 
granted  (in  1993-1996).  This  would  bring the  maximum  release  of 
reserves between 1997 and 2002 to 245 million ecus. provided, of  comse. 
·that none of the debtors defaulted and that the problem of guaranteeing 
ECSC engagements going beyond 2002 has been resolved. 
(iv)  In any event, an irreducible sum of ECSC reserves of 16.3  million ecus 
should be maintained to cover existing com.mjtments which extend beyond 
2002. 
(v)  The above considerations therefore highlight the following points: 
the present level of  reserves is necessary to guarantee the proper execution 
of  current commitments artd those provided for up to 31  December 1996. 
No .release of reserves can  be countenanced during this period, tmless an 
alternative guarantee is pmvided (e.g. by the EEC~ cf. Section Vll). 
for the period 1997-2002. a gradual release of reserves? linked with the 
amortizations of loans, up to a maximum of 245 million ecus. could be 
considered. 
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with regard to the remaining guarantee :fimd (168 million ecus to cover the 
ECSC's fina!!cial  a:ctiviti.es other  than the outStanding loans);· there could 
: also . be a  grad~al release.  which· is  a  function  of the ECSC's' global 
activities  (loans  and  the  budget) 'and  consequently . more· .difficult  to 
quantifY at present. 
Vl  EFFECfS!OF A JRANSFER OF THE ECSCS AQWIIJFS ON TBE·CAPITAL 
AND ECU MARKETS 
I.  The effect on the capital markets of the transfer ·of.the ECSC' activities to the EIB 
will depends on the scale of the  tr~:alSa.Ctions concerned 
d  .•....  ·. 
·,It  should  be- noted.,··however,  that the  Effi~ has  now ·become·;the  major· world 
borrower on  the  financial  markets.  and  that the question  of' saturation  and/or a 
"volume premium
11  could arise.  Maintaining the ECSC instrument means that the 
.  . si!matures can be diversifi~ which increases the institutions' capacity to  absorb 
..  paper  .... 
2.  .  Th~re is no direct effect on the ecu market, other than that the Comm~ity  deprives 
· ·itself of a potential issuer which is a natural user of  this currency.  The ecu. market 
needs first class issuers in order to develop~ and .the multiplicity of signatures is a 
positive factor in this matter_ 
.  ''• 
3 .. , .  The important role played by the.ECSC as an .investor in the ecu-den<:Jminated.bond 
market must. also be emphasized  The sum administered is approximately 2 .000 
million ecus (which represents basically the amount of the guarantee fimd  and the 
, commitment yet to be. disbursed). It is one  ·of the main portfolios: in this ctirrency 
and constitutes a significant pillar of both the primary and- secondary markets in 
ecus  ..  While this role will be reduced as the expiry d3.te of 1he Treaty .a+Jproaches, 
·in the present context 1hese operations will· make a substantial contribution to the 
maturing of  the market  ,  ;', r  . 
- .,  :. f.,' 
VU. ·  POSSmn.ITY OF  .USING AN EEC GUARANTEE . · . 
,:'•. 
.  .  .  '  .-::· . 
A  takeover by the EIB· of the ECSC loan activities :is .not .the only way .of (gradually) 
releasing the reserves.  Granting a guarantee from the EEC budget for.ECSC.loans would 
also lead to the·release of these reserves.  · 
(a)  The "guarantee" ·option  appears particularly appropriate· fot the  Article 56  loans. 
r  This  would  involve  proposing  to  the  Council. that :the  EEC  shoul.d  provide  a: 
guarantee to cover all .ECSC loans corresponding to, the loans outstanding urider 
Article  56,  .and  plus a  global  a.rnount-,.(of.  a.  size. to  be determined)  for  future 
borrowings under this Article.  At '!he same time, the Commission would undertake 
to limit new lo~s under Article 56 to the ammount guanmteed in this manner.  The 
ammount subsequently be,r~sed subject to ~e.  Co1JI!.cil's  appr:o~al..  ·· 
16 Since loans tmder Article 56 are granted mainly to financial institutions, the risk for 
the EEC budget would be very small and similar to that of  other borrowings already 
guaranteed by  a token entry (e.g. NCI loans). 
Ibis option would have the following advantages: 
- immediate release of a portion of  the ECSC's reserves (i.e.  86 million ecus); 
- the future trend in  the amount of loans under Article 56 and the related rebates 
would be clear and manageable; 
- it would be possible to continue for a certain period to assist conversion (m line 
with  the growth  initiative)  without changing the e:xisting  organization and  the 
recently approved procedures; 
- for borrowing and lending activities, there would be a clear separation between 
the field  of conversion,  now lirLk:ed  to  the EEC  and  having no  effect on the 
ECSCs reserves, and the "ECSC industry" field.  Apart from the requirements 
relating to ou:tstanding loans under Article 54 (second paragraph), the remaining 
reserves  would be  clearly  devoted  to  covering loans to  industry  (loans  under 
Article 54 (first paragraph)). 
(b)  The "guarantee" option could also be extended to all ECSC loans.  In that case, the 
part of the guarantee fimd linked to the loans, Le.  261  million ec~  would become 
available. 
Such a proposal would imply  an effort on behalf of the budgetary authority which 
could in essence involve one of the following options: 
(i)  to express clearly the intent to cover any actual  risk by recourse to  the 
ECSC levy (Article 50 of  the ECSC Treaty); this, however, goes against 
the wishes expressed by the Council and the industry; 
(ii)  to cover the risk by a token entry guarantee "p.m.", as has been the case 
for NCI loans and some EIB loans.  In this case, considering the parlous 
state of the industrial sectors concerned. and in view of the fact that the 
existing reserves of  the ECSC are deemed to be "adequate" (see report 9f 
the Court of  Auditors on the ECSC 1992 accounts). Member States should 
be aware that the utmsation of the ECSC reserves for budgetary purposes 
will most likely lead to an additional call on Members' resources to cover 
expected def1Wlts if  and when they occur. The transfer of  the risk from the 
ECSC to the EEC would.  also have as a  consequence that the coal and 
steel sectors would be the sole beneficiaries of  the utilisation of  the ECSC 
reserves while the burden of  the guarantee would fall on the general EEC 
budget; 
(iii)  to create, on a similar model to the "guarantee fund". a specific reserve to 
cover the risks of  the ECSC loans. 
17 ·- ..  ~ 
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As regards the period post-2002. the question will  in  any  case arise in  the wider 
framework - as  poin~ed  OJ.It in ~e  Not~ of  ~e  Danish Presidency -·of the ~an  tee 
for  ECSC  oonunitm~en~ going  beyond  ~e.· ~nd  qf th~ pepod of yalidit}r  9f the 
Treaty.  After 2002,  since it will  DO  longer  be possible'io' resort to :the  levY~ the 
outstan.ding ECSC bonds will be guaranteed only by the remainder ofthe "guarantee 
fund"  calculated on the b~s._of.the sqlvcncy ratio ..  $~ch a 'guarantee. i!;'fusUfncient 
to maintain therr AAA rating .. The Commission: mot  e,(pose· itself ~o the' risk of 
a fall in the rating of  ECSC bonds after 2002: this :would jeopardize th'e credibility 
Qf all the Emopean institutions. since ~e  Community would have failed. to sho'Y its 
supPo.rt for one of  them. The ~.arantee of  the general budget (EEC)! 'oi a guarantee 
of an equivalent value, could .be one of the possible ways of  'resolVing post-2002 
ECSC commitments which should be· studied in  dewt· at a  late~ ~age.·  ·  ···  · · 
.  .  .  ~  .  ~,.  '··  .  .  .  .  . 
vm  .. ·POTENTIAL FOR TAKEOVER OF CERTAIN ECSC FiNANOALACTIVITIFS 
BY OTHER BODIES  .  . .  .  ..  ·.;.  ·  .  . 
1.  Possible ~ver  by the EBRD 
The  EBRD was established to  assist in finance  for  the countries of central  and 
~ern  Europe and of the former  So~et Union ·(PHARE and TACIS.couD.triesr  · 
,.  •  •  •  •  ...  '  . •  • •  '  "  •  •  ~.  ~-~  •  ~·  •••  1 • 
The fact is that the bulk of ECSC loan activities are targeted at projects within the 
Comm~ty. 
The only loans capable of being transferred to the EBim wOuld be  th~se  of the 
CEEC facility under Article 95. totalling 200 million e~.  But. as was pomted out 
in Section m.s above, when considerina the possibility of transferring. these loans 
to the Ei::B. ·the CEEC facilitY has already. been the rubject of'  a  general~  Coriinllssion 
Oecision with the assent of the Co1mciL and that Decison has been notified to the 
sbtt~ coO:eemed; a  :~er  to'the EBRD (ioes not  th~refore aPP~~  t<l'b~ ~order.' '  . 
'  •;  •  •  :  •  ;.  •  ~ •  '  ~  •  :• •  •'  •  > •:  '.  .- :; I  ::'  '.' 
2.·  Possible ·bdmover by public- or poV1de-se(tnr finRndal insitutions in the  Member 
s~  .  .  .  .  ...  _.,. 
This poSsibility -~  for the follo-wing  eomm~~:· 
·.~  .  - .: . 
· - the ECSC can already call upon a vast ~etwork fonhe finance of S:MEs and small 
· scale projects in  the  f'ranie\vork  of the a}oballoans und-er  ArtiCles  54 (second 
··paragr&ph) and  56 gnmted to fin_ancial  institutions from both the private)md the 
p~bllc seCtors in the Member States. In  ·  additio~ agency ·&greetrient:S have been 
signed ~th  .. the' leamng national ·development·o'tianisatidns for the pui'poses:'of 
· ECSC  generall~nding actiVity;  ·  · ·  ···  ·  '·  ··  ·  ·  ·· 
- in the event of a mandate or assignment of actiVities,  tb.e  problems raised in 
. conried!on with· an  BIB  takeover ·would apply a fortiori ~md iri m  eveJ:!.'·m.are 
complex  manner  •.  silice  the  activities  ':9iowa: be  being. taken·  'out'  'of. the 
18 Community's institutional framework. The task would not be made easier by the 
large number of candidates who would have to be approached; 
- participation in the financing of coal and steel investment projects is already open 
to the muket influences of  supply and demand, and any bank whose house rules 
permit it may already participate; 
- the  one interesting aspect of such  an  option  is  the direct granting  of interest 
rebates by the ECSC without going throught the global loans mechanism. But this 
question only concerns ECSC conversion loans (Article 56 (2) (a), and has already 
been considered in examination of the EIB option. 
From a legal standpoint, it remains to be seen whether a distinction can be made 
between ECSC interest rebates and ECSC loans. In practical terms it should not 
be forgotten that the reserves frozen as a consequecne of Article 56 global loans 
are 2.8% of the total  amount  loaned.  whilst the budgetary burden of interest 
rebates is 15%. 
It should  be  added  that  in  the  context  of the  Memorandum  of the  French 
Delegation. which advocates abandoning Article 56 rebates, this question does not 
arise. 
Detailed examination of all these possibilities and of the leaal aspects inherent in 
each is·quite disproportionate to the practical results produced. 
IX  COMMENTS  ON IDE .MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH DELF.GA TION 
The present note answers generally the points raised in the French Memorandum dealing 
with the ECSC's borrowing and lending activity and its impact on  reserves. 
It may nevertheless be worthwhile mAking the following observations: 
as regards the transfer of activities, the Memorandum appears to address only the 
question of applications; the Commission shares this view entirely; 
as  regards  the  date  for  an  end to  ECSC  borrowing  and  lending  activity,  the 
Memorandum  sets  1994  as  its  target.  For  part of the  Article  54  loans  the 
Commission shares this aixn.  For the remaining sectors, prudence would appear to 
dictate a  more flexible  approach,  geared to taking greater account of the EIB's 
efFective capacity to take over the activity, and the need to complete work currently 
in hand; 
the French authorities believe thar a  Commission policy  aimed  at continuing to 
launch m-Jor issues on the financial markets would be misguided. The Commission 
19 - wishes  to  point  out that ·it  has  rtever  followed  such  a  policy:  the  volume  of 
borrowings has always reflected  th·~ locm  applications received and approved. 
The Commission would further point out that from the point of  view of  the future of  the 
ECSC Treaty, the problem i~.not the volume.of operations still to be dealt with, but rather 
the impact of those operations on reserves. 
Finally. the French Memorandum re:commends that the coal and steel sectors should 
· ·be treated  on  the  same  footing  as  other· sectors  of industry  via  non-specific 
Community instrumentS. Since the submission of  the Memorandum; and in the light 
of the critical situation in these sectors and in the steel industry in particular, the 
Commission has with the full cooperation of the Council been proposing-a number 
of measures based on the potential of  the ECSC Treaty. 
X.  COMMENTS ON T8E NOTE .py IRE DANISH PRESIDENCY 
The Commission supportS the general principles underlying the guidelines set out in the 
Note·ofthe·Danish Presidency of 10 jm1e 1993. 
The information set out in the present note is an illustration of the Commission's desire 
to keep the C01mcil fully informed of all aspects of  the ECSC's borrowing .and lending 
·activity. and the options proposed are an indication of the Commission's  concem  to 
continue the pursuit of essentially the same aims. 
The additional information on the loans currently  under consideration by the Council, 
given in Annex 1, is the direct result of the suggestions set out in Point 6 of  the Note by 
th Danish Presidency. 
XL  CONCLUSIONS 
L  The Commjssion  must  carry  through  to  their  conclusion  operations  which  are 
already under way. This means 1ha:t: 
(a)  any transfer can concern only new applications; 
(b)  there can be no release of reserves before 1997. 
2.  The transfer of  ECSC activities to the Em poses legal problems. The only way to 
avoid revision of the Treaty, a  long and hazardoUs procedure,  would be for the 
ECSC  · to  abandon  unilaterally  certain  activities  and  for  the Em  to  enlarge its 
eligibility criteria to cover the grour1d left vacant by the ECSC. Even this approach 
is not without legal difficUlties. · 
20 3.  ·  An examination of ECSC lending activity with a view to the possible takeover of 
this activity by the EIB requires a distinction to be made between three categories 
of operation: 
- activities which can'be transfem~d immediately:  essentially, this concerns loans 
under Article 54 (second paragraph) for the consumption of Community coal or 
steel  in  major in:frastructure  projects.  The Commission reserves,  however,  the 
possibility of an ECSC intervention in large projects with a specific commtmity 
interest  as  long  as  the  loans  concerned  do  not  imply  the  immobilisation  of 
reserves. 
- activities  which  can be transferred at a  later 5tag£l:  this  concerns  loans  under 
Article 54 (first paragraph) and loans under Article 56 (2) (a). As regards Article 
54 (first paragraph) loans,  we should wait until  the crisis  is  over.  In As for 
Article  56  loans, in any  event we should  await the  expiry  of the  1994-1996 
Community Support Frameworks under Objective 2; 
- activities which cannot be transferred: this concerns loans for workers
1  housing, 
certain  Article  54  (second  paragraph)  loans· and  the  Article  95  facility  of 
200 million ecus for the cotmtries of Central and Eastern Europe, which the BIB 
is tmwilling or unable to take over 'Without a Community guarantee. 
4.  In  all  events.  and  in order to  maximise  the  gradual  release  of ECSC  reserves 
between  now  and  2002.  the  Commission  advocates  the  following  immediate 
measures for the types of loans which can be transferred immediately or later. 
(a.)  ECSC loans approved from  1.1.94  (other than  those  not involving  the 
freezing of reserves) will not have a life extending beyond  2002~ 
(b)  ECSC  loans  granted  between  1993  and  1996  should  not  involve  the 
freezing of more reserves than are rei eased during the same period as a 
result of  the repayment of current loans; 
(c)  The freezing of  reserves  ~o-ainst ECSC loans to be paid from 1997 should 
not exceed a percentage to be set annually during preparation of the draft 
ECSC budget. That percentage will refer to the amotmt of  r~erves to be 
released during the accmmting year in question. 
(d)  The EIB  will be  invited  to  intervene,  applying  its  own  criteria.,  in  the 
financing of projects of the Article 54 (first and second paragraph) type. 
Unless the present crisis persists and certain ECSC companies  become unable to 
meet  their  liabilities,  and  provided  a  solution  is  found  to  the  problem  of 
guaranteeing ECSC committments extending beyond 2002 (see Section VIT.  final 
21 paragraph), these measures should permit the release, between now and 2002, of  245 
million ecu from the part of  the guarantee ftmd  covering lending activity. 
It is  more difficult to determine how much can be released from  the part of the 
guarantee fund covering--the off balance sheet items.  Assuming that 50% of -this 
becomes available (some 80 million ecu}, we should arrive at a total of325 million 
ecu of reserves which can be releac;ed before 2002. 
It should be noted that a takeover of certain activities by the EIB  (or any other 
body) will  do nothing to  increase further the reserves which can be released as a 
result of  the measures recommended by the Commission. 
22 ANNEX 1 
INFORMATIONS ON .WAN REQUESTS 
A  V  AITING THE COUNCIL'S ASSENT Am.oant of loan 
Objecti\'e &  country 
Date of  Application 
Impact on the reserves 





Recon-version Global Loan • France 
25.01.93 
ECU  1.259.550  I 
5 year  tranches, not beyond 2002 
mt. 562 ECSC Treaty 
1  monthly  ECU  rate  octobE~r 1993 BANCAJA 
Amount of loan  LSOO mio PTA  '. 
Objective & eonntly 
'  .  ·Reconversion global loan • Spain  . 
Date of Application  3.ll.i992 
Impact on the reserves  ECU 272.361  1 
Lengh and mlrtarity 
of  loan  .  7 years tranche's, not beyond 2002. 
Legal basis  . art 56.2 ECSC Treaty 
1 monthly ECU rate october 1993 Amoottt of loan 
Objective &  cotmtry 
Date of Application 
Impact on  the reserves 
Length and matxlrity 
of loan 
Legal basis 
1 monthly ECU rate october 1993 
1.500 111io  PTA 




7 yean1  tnmch~  not beyond 2002 
mt. 56  .. 2 ECSC Treaty Atn.ollll:t of  lo~ 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reser..-es 





HUTA KA  n>WICE 
. US$  SO Mio 
Contin11ous  casting  of blooms  n°  1  of the  fum  Imta 
Katowice, Poland 
August 1992 
no iolpact of  this lending activity on the ECSC reserves 
before 2002 
art. 95 ECSC Treaty Amount of loan 
Objective & coUil!ry 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis 
1 monthly ECU rate october 1993 
LKAB (Suede) 
975 Mio SKR 
1.  Iron ore mine in K.irona  (Sweden) : new principal 
operating level at a depth of 1045 m 
2.  New i:nstallaton for the production of  mineral pellets 





art. 54.2 ECSC Treaty ''  ·~  .}•  '  ' 
''·'  "  '•  •  •  :'  '  ._:  ~  ..•  ·•  • •.•  •••  •  l.  . ,.  "  •  • 
DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCRAFJ:SBA!J( 
Amount of loan 
Objective &. country 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves  : 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis  · 
1  monthly ECU rmc october 1993 
.DM 20 Mio 




5 years t:ranches, not beyond 2002 
art. 56.2 ECSC Trem.y WF.SmEUTSCHE U-ImESBANK EUROPA AG 
Amonnt of loan 
Objective &  country 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of  loan 
Legal basis 
1 monthly EG[J rate october 1993 
FF 60 Mia 
Recon-version Global loan - Fnmce 
08.12.1992 
ECU 251.910- I 
5 years:  t:ra.n.ches1 not  beyond 2002 
art 56.2 ECSC Treaty .Amount of. lOa.rl  :· .. .  ··  • · 
Objective & coantly 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
on loan 
Legal basis 
'  0:  •  • '  •  :' ·:.·  ·~~· '-:  ••• '. 
.  ~' .  '  '  .:.·;  '  ...  ,,  ·~·  ": 
KIMBERLEY CLARK PLC 
·.  ~  '  . 
'  .  ,.·  ·:· 
·: GBP  7.~ :Mio 
Construction  of  a  mill  to  produce  disposable  diapers 
includiJ:tg finished product warehouse ~  support fac~es  M 
South Humberside (UK) 
19.03.1992 
EC.U  1~41.632. 
1 
5 year; 
art. 562 ECSC Treaty 
1 monthly ECU rnte october 1993 SQUlB VORI<SDJRE PASSt;r{CER TRANSPORT EXEClJTWE 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Applicaton 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis 
1 monthly ECU rate october 1993 
GBP 102 Mio 
Develop and operate a system of light rail tnmsit. It wiD nse 





art 54.2 ECSC Treaty ANNEX 2.  ;  SOLVENCY RATIO 
The Solvency Ratio· wa5· established by the clirecrlve 89/647icEE of the Council dated 18th 
of December  19.8?.  This  ~o  is meant  to  improve  the  monitoring  by  the  respective 
regulatory authontleS of  the nsk management ofcredit institutions. It is calculated as follows: 
Equity. 
Solvency ratio=  ·-----·---· 
(Assets + Off balance sheet items) weighted· 
The numerator includes the equity funds of  1he credit institution; for the ECSC it .includes 
only the Guar~tee  Fund.  The other reserves which feature in the ECSC balanee sheet cmnot 
be considered as available reserves in as much as they are earmarked for the financing oflong 
term assets (subsidised housing loans). 
The denominator is the sum of the  asse~ weighted in 'relation to the degree of credit rislc 
assumecl Similarly each off balance sheet item (contingent liabilities) is also weighted as a 
ftmction of  the potential credit risk it involves. 
In  order to  determine  the  specific  level  at  which  the  ECSC  solvency  ratio  should  be 
maintained  .. taking into account the specificity of  the ECSC's activity and the special situation 
of the  coal  and  steel  sectors,  1he  Commission  commissioned  a  study  by  the  firm  of 
internationally recognized experts, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte. The study concludes that the 
.  ECSC solvency ratio should be maintained in a brecket of 14 % to 16 % . Since the closing 
of  the ECSC accounts at 31/12/1991, the application of  the results of  this study has led to the 
release of  about 50 million ECU to finance the operational budget of the ECSC. Within  the 
framework of the approval procedure of the ECSC 1992 accounts, the Commission decided 
to follow this approach. At December 31  1992. the solven~  ratio of the ECSC  was 14.31%. 
Within. this contex.t. one should point out that the ECSC Guarantee Fund at 31/12/1992 stood 
at ECU 429,885,000. The part  of the  Guarantee Ftmd :rttributable  to  the loan  portfolio 
amounts to ECU 261 446 000 (see Annex: it-). while the balance, i.e. ECU 168 439 000, covers 
other assets, as well as off balance sheet items according to the following breakdown: 
• Loans and advances to Credit institutions 
- Bank deposits 
-Portfolio 
~ Fixed assets 
- Other assets 
-Accruals 
- Off balance sheet : swaps 
~ Off  balance sheet : other 
TOTAL 
1 607 1-28 
18  646  503 
12  723  762 
940 875 
11  083  728 
12 724 616 
74 507 607 
36 204 481 
168 439 000 lV 
<J1 
#  • 
SITUATION AS AT 3ht JULY 1993 { MECU) 
AMOUNT  INCL. 64.1 
I.  GLOBAL LOANS SIGNED, NOT OISEIURSEO  t.831,  14  . 
DIRECT LOANS SIGNED, NOT DISBURSED  594,75  62,92 
GLOBAl lOANS DECIDED, NOT SIGNED  132,44  . 
DIRECT LOANS  DECIDED, NOT SIGNED  424,50  156,22 
CCEE FACILITY DECIDED, NOT SIGNED  200,00  . 
Sub-total I  3.182,63  239,14 
I  I.a.  GLOBAL LOANS DECIDED REQUIRING COUNCIL ASSENT  86,70  . 
DIRECT \.OA.t-15  DEC!DED  REOU!R~NC  COUNClL ASSENT  127,05  -
(Sub-lotel ll.a.  213,75} 
ll.b.  GLOBAL LOANS AWAITING DECISION  493,65  32,09 
DIRECT LOANS  AWAITING DECISION  1.674,97  600,15 
(Sub -totalll.b  .2.166,52) 
I 
Suh·totalll  2.362.27  632,24 
Ul.  STEEL RESTRUCTURING LOAN  (53.1'1)  1.000,00  1.000,00 
Totals I t  II + Ill  6.665,10  1.671,38 
ANNEX 3 
INCl. 54.2  tNCL 00.2  ART. 95 
167,87  1.673;l7  . 
376,41  135,42  . 
.  132,4A  -
66,00  200,26  . 
.  -
200,00 
602,28  2.141,41 
200,00 
- Ba,70  -
117,98  9,07  . 
9,67  375,86  -




1.026,44  721,!59  I  . 
.  - -
1.830,72  2.863,  200,00 ANNEX 4 : Redemption oi ECSC k1ans outmnding at 31112192 with corre:sponding potenti.al relea:sc 
of  Gummtee Fonds 
The table below indicates the rate of  redemption ofECSC loans outstanding at 31/12/92 in the yean 
1993 antil2018 with the c:ott.seqa.CJUial release of  the reserves. This release is only theoretical as the 
table does not take account of  the ECSC lending operations completed after 1/1/93 nor into the fntate 
which woUld haVe 8II impact on the reserves.  .  .  . 
YEAR  LOANS  REDEEMED  RESERVES  RELEASED 
1993  974.417.162  31.098  .  .589 
1994  1'.124.145.851  22.694.778 
1995  1.042.S56.271  31.310.705 
1996  1.879.740.374  82.327.242 
1997  1.553.425"252  36.604.940 
1998  176.553.49 I  6.878.365 
1999  195.927.478  6.843.132  .. 
iooo  102.021.510  3.344.285 
2001  167.538.365  . 15.630.472 
2002  95.425.936  .  8.41/.972· 
2003  7.386.475  222.180 
2004  7.173.407  217.664 
2005  6.43/.608  200.865 
2006  5.634.160  178.718 
2007  5.329.151  172.030 
2008  3.376.528  11-1.155 
2009  88.582.916  76.528 
2010  I 
1.880.013  72.162 
2011  JA06.76t  56.083 
2012  59.352.239  322.073 
2013  982.832  27.371 
2014  500.695  13.945 
2015  ! 
285.956  8.006 
2016  288.816  8.085 
2017  I 
120.621.981  J-.1.536.165 
2018  2.816.190  15.504 
TOI4l  7. 72!.80L409  261.#6.009 ANNEX 5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RElEASED BE1WEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOlLOWING THE MEASURES FORESEEN BY THE CO:MMISSION 
TiffiORETICAL 
YEAR  RELEASE OF  USAGE  RECOVERY  POTENTIAL 
RESERVES  RELEASE 
1993  31  098 5&9  - 31  098 589  0 
1994  22 694 778  -22 694 778  0 
1995  31 310 70S  .:n :no 7os  0 
1996  82  327 242  ~ 82  :;27 242  0 
1997  36 604 940  27 905 219  64 510  159 
1998  6  878 .365  27 90S  219  34 783 584 
1999  6 843 132  27 905 219  34 748 351 
2000  3 344 285  27  905  219  31  249 504 
2001  15  630 472  27 905 219  43 535  IS91 
2002  8 411  97'}.  27 90S 219  36 317 191 
TOTAL  245 144 480  • 167 431 3!4  167 431 314  245  144 480 
REMARKS 
1.  Since we start from the hypothesis that the loans having an impact on reserves cannot go 
beyond 2002,  all reserves  being released according  to  the  first column (maturing of 
outstanding loans) will become available before 2002. 
2.  What can change. as a result of the r1:!:serves being blocked for the loans between 1993 
and 2002, is the time the reserves are in fact released and made available for budgetazy 
requiremen-ts (last column)-ANNEX 5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RE,LEASED  BETWEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOLLOWING THE MEASURES FORESEEN BY THE COl'IIMisSION 
YE~  THEORETICAL  tiS  AGE  RECOvtRY  POTEL~TIAL 
REu:A.S£ OF  RELEAS'E 
tu:!:ER.VES  %  ecu  1993- 1996  19!?7. 2002 
1993  :31  09S: S89  100%  -31 09& 589  0 
19194  2269471&  100%  ··22 694778  0 
J!)SIS  31  3lG 705  100%  -Jl 310 705  0 
1996  ~  327242  100%  ·.SZ 3l7 24Z  0 
1SlSl"''  l6 504940  2S%  ·9 m ns  1.7905 219  27 453 705  ss 358 924 
199!  68'1'!365  25%  -1719  591  2790:5' 219  6 989 Oll  34 1194 2.40 
1999  6143 Il2  25  ~1.  -1 710 783  27905 219  7392494  3S :z<n 713 
2000  3 344 285,  25%  -SU 071  27 905 219  s  338 620  33 243 8351 
lDOl  15 630472  25%  -3  907 618  27 90S 219  14 Sl7l  295  42.876 Sl4 
:2002  8 411972  0%  0  27 oos 219  15 568 031  43 473 Z.So 
TOTAL  24S 144 480  ·184 756 613  167 431 314  77713 l66.  24.5  144 480 
' 
YEAR  11:1£0RETICAL  USAGE  RECO'\I"'ERY  POTENI'IAL 
RELEASE Of  RELEASE 
RES~RVES  %  .ECU  1993. 1996  1997-2001 
1991  31098 m  100 eAJ  ·31  098' SS9  0 
19194  22694m  100 '10  -22 04 778  0 
l~S  31:110705  100%  ·31310 70S  .() 
~  22 327 242  100%  -82327 24:1  0 
. 1!)97  36 604 5)40  50%  -18 302 470  Z7 905 :Zl!J  18 302 470  <16 207 6119 
1998  687&36S  50 o/o  ·3 439 183  ').7 !]05 219  7 o99 677  l5 004 SSI6 
1999  d &43  lSZ  SO%  -3 421 .566  rr 9osz1~  7941 &S6  3S84707S 
2000  :U4428S  50%  -1672 143  '1:T 905 219  7 332 9S4  3!5 238 173 
2001  15 630 472  SO%  ·7 81S 236  27905 219  14 312  119'  42 217 338 
2002  8 411972  0%  0  27 905 219  22 724091  so 629 310 
TOTAL  245 144 4SO  -202 081911  167·m 3\4  77 713 166  245144 480 ANNEX 5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RELEASED BETWEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOlLOWING THE 1\mASURES FORESEEN BY THE CO:MMISSION 
YEAR  THEORETICAl..  OSAGl~  RECO'VERY  POTEN!IAL 
RELEASE OF  RELEASE 
RESERVES  %  ECU  !993. !996  1997. 2002 
1993  :H 098 S89  100%  --31  09S 589  0 
19194  22  G94 778  100%  ..  .22  694 m  0 
199S  31  310 10S  100%  .. 31  310 70S  0 
1996  22 327 241  100%  .. 82 327241  0 
1997  ~  604940  7.S%  ·27 453 705  Z7 90S 2I9  Sll~l :us  ~7  O.S6 454 
!998  6 878 365  15%  ·5 158 774  v  ?05 21?  72t0 332  3$ 113 S51 
1999  6 S43 132  75 O,.(,  .s 132 349  27 90S 21~  8491 217  36 396 436 
2000  .3  344 28S  75%  -2 .So8 214  Z7 905 219  9327289  372l1.508 
2001  15 63G 47'2  15%  .. u 722 !54  27 9G5 219  13 6,2 941  41  558 l6l 
2002  8 4tt 97:2.  0%  0  21905 219  29 880 150  57n!i !69 
TOTAL  245 144 480  ~219 407 :llO  167 431 314  TTTI3  166  245 144 480 
Y£AR  TREORE'I'ICAL  USAG£  RECOVERY  POTENTIAL 
U)..U..SE OF  RELE'.ASE 
RESERVES  %  ECU  1993. 1996  1997-2002 
1993  31098 589  100%  -3l 09S 539  0 
19194  22 694 778  lOO%  -22 694 m  0 
1995  3l 310 70S  100%  -31 310 ?OS  0 
1996  82 327 24:2  100%  ..s2n7 242  0 
1997  36 604 94{1  100%  -36 604 940  Z7 90S  21~  0  Z7~ll9 
1998  g 878 365  100%  ·6 878 36S  27 905 2.19  7320 988  3.5 226207 
1999  ~ 84:3  132  100%  -6 843  .132  2i 90S 21.9  9 040$19  36 ~j  798 
:2000  3 344 28S  100 o/o  -:3 344 2'8S  'J:1905 21!)  11321 623  J!l 226 S42 
2001  15 630 472:  100%  -15630472  :r1905 219  12 993 766  40 19S Sl1S 
2002  8 411972  0  '!.~  0  27 90S 219  3703G 210  6'4 5141  4l9 
TOTAL  2A5  144480  ·23o 'iJZ sos  167 431 314  TT 113 166  245 144480 
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